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I. INTRODUCTION
This Note traces the effect of Michigan v. Long' on the develop-
ment of state constitutional protections in criminal cases and the shift
in the balance between federal and state protection in such cases. In
Long, the Supreme Court of the United States held that when a state
court based its decision on both state and federal law and it was
unclear whether the decision rested on state or federal grounds, the
Court would assume it rested on federal law.2 The Court, therefore,
would have jurisdiction to review the decision if it wished to do so.
The Supreme Court, however, allowed the state courts to escape such
review if they clearly stated that their decisions were based on "bona
fide separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds."3 The
Court's stated intent was to allow state courts to "develop state juris-
prudence unimpeded by federal interference."4 In practice, however,
many state courts have continued to rely on federal law and principles
1. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
2. Id. at 1040-4 1.
3. Id. at 1041.
4. Id.
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and have only included in their opinions a one sentence disclaimer
stating that their decisions rest on independent and adequate state
grounds.5 This one sentence disclaimer is the "rubber stamp" that
some state courts have used to escape the Court's review while avoid-
ing the necessity of truly developing state constitutional law.
This introduction is the first of five sections contained in this
Note. Section II discusses the Supreme Court's inconsistent treat-
ment of cases involving mixed state and federal constitutional issues
prior to Long. In addition, it analyzes the Long decision itself. Sec-
tion III examines those Supreme Court cases subsequent to Long in
which the state courts did not include the rubber stamp and the
Court, after accepting review, overruled the state court's expansion of
individual rights. Further, this section analyzes these cases on remand
to investigate whether the state courts reinstated their original deci-
sions by explicitly applying their state constitutions or whether they
simply deferred to the Supreme Court. Sections II and III also dis-
cuss the inability of the Long approach to achieve the goals the Court
set out at both the state and federal levels: First, "to provide state
judges with a clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unim-
peded by federal interference;" 6 and second, to "preserve the integrity
of state law."7 Section IV discusses the continuing reluctance of some
state courts to apply their state constitutional principles as the pri-
mary grounds for their decisions. This section also explores the range
of approaches that state courts continue to use in cases raising both
state and federal constitutional issues.
Section V concludes that the Court's approach in Long has failed
thus far to respond to the concerns expressed by the majority of the
Supreme Court in that case. Ambiguity continues as to the appropri-
ate standard for Supreme Court review of state court opinions that
contain some combination of federal and state law. As a result, the
Court's review continues to be too broad under the Long approach in
cases in which decisions that rely on state grounds are reinstated by
the state courts on remand, and too narrow when state courts' deci-
sions with the rubber stamp successfully evade Supreme Court
review.8 This Note hypothesizes that the Long doctrine could result
in a shift of ultimate authority9 over the interpretation of the federal
Constitution to the state courts because of their ability to rubber
5. See infra Section IV.
6. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
7. Id.
8. See infra Section V.
9. See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
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stamp their decisions. 0 It recognizes that the validity of this hypoth-
esis depends on the continuing application of the Long approach by
the Supreme Court. It also recognizes that the Court is free to modify
or overturn the current method by which it reviews state court
decisions.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S GOALS IN Michigan v. Long
A. Historical Perspective
Long can best be viewed as a part of the Supreme Court's chang-
ing perception of its role in shaping basic constitutional rights. In the
1950's and 1960's, the Warren Court expanded the constitutional pro-
tection of individual rights in the context of criminal cases. I" The
1970's saw a transition to a more conservative philosophy under Chief
Justice Warren Burger.' 2 Some argue that the Burger Court's intent
was "to reverse the trend of the past decade and to constrict rather
than expand the rights of the accused."' 3 This change in direction is
said to have brought about "a new period of federalism in criminal
procedure in which the state-based rights of criminal defendants will
assume increasing significance as federal-based rights play an ever-
diminishing role."' 4
Many scholars interpret the decisions of the Burger Court as
10. See infra Section IV.
11. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedures.- State Court Evasion of the
Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974). Professor Wilkes refers to this period of expansion as
the "criminal procedure revolution," and claims that it occurred in two parts: "First, through
a process of 'selective incorporation,' provisions of the Bill of Rights were held applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment .... Second, liberal
interpretations of the Bill of Rights greatly expanded the scope of federal constitutional
protections." Id. at 422 (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
12. Wilkes, supra note 11, at 423.
13. Id. Professor Wilkes claims that even "[i]n cases where an accused's rights were
plainly violated," the Burger Court has upheld convictions "by generous construction of the
harmless error doctrine." Id. at 423-24 (citing Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972);
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972)). But see THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed. 1983) (arguing that the Burger Court has not
limited rights extended during the Warren era).
14. Wilkes, supra note 11, at 426; see also Collins & Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation
Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L.
REV. 317 (1986). The following tables compiled by Professors Collins and Galie demonstrate
statistically just how much the Supreme Court's review practices have changed during the past
two decades. During the 1965-1966 term, the states' certiorari success rate was only slightly
better than that of individual claimants. In contrast, the 1984-1985 term shows a great increase
in the rate of state petitions granted review over that of individuals' petitions:
1987]
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reflecting an intent to constrict, or at least prevent further expansion
of, federal constitutional protections of defendants in criminal cases.
Rights above the federal floor will exist, if at all, only through state
constitutional protections. 5 Given this intent, the logical inference
must be that the Burger Court did not expect state courts to extend
state constitutional rights beyond the new federal levels being set by
the Court.16 To accomplish its objectives, however, the Supreme
Court has had to exercise its jurisdiction to review cases in which
state courts have granted more extensive individual rights than the
Court was willing to accept, instead of only accepting those cases in
which the defendants complained of a denial of their federal constitu-
tional rights.17 The difficulty for the Court in deciding whether to
review a case arose in cases in which the state courts responded to this
expanded review by using a blend of federal and state law in their
TABLE I
















Total Granted Granted (%)
Petitions filed by individual
rights claimants
Paid Docket 206 28 13.6
Petitions filed by State
Officials 6 1 16.6
Id. at 342-43.
15. Wilkes, supra note 11, at 425-26; see also Pollock, Adequate and Independent State
Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX.
L. REV. 977, 980 (1985) (state constitutions may build additional protections above the federal
floor).
16. A state court might be reluctant to extend state constitutional rights for many reasons.
Elected or appointed state judges, for example, may be reluctant to extend rights in a
controversial area; or, a state court that extends rights under its state constitution might be
held accountable for the extension, thereby becoming a target of conservative criticism.
17. See supra note 14. Although this Note's analysis is limited to criminal cases, the
situation of mixed federal and state law may appear outside the criminal context. It is
interesting, although beyond the scope of this Note, that the Court's presumption of the
grounds that civil cases with mixed state and federal grounds rest on, has been almost exactly
opposite to that established by the Court in Long.
[Vol. 42:159
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decisions. Prior to Long, the Supreme Court traditionally had denied
review in cases in which there was an "adequate state ground," even if
intermixed with federal law.' 8 The Court, in addition, would not
review cases that gave greater federal constitutional protection to
defendants.' 9 This pattern changed with Long. The state courts
could now extend state constitutional rights, but unless the state deci-
sions rested on "adequate and independent" state grounds, they were
subject to review by the Supreme Court.2 °
Prior to Long, the Court resorted to four approaches to review-
ing state court decisions that relied on a mixture of state and federal
grounds in determining the rights of an accused. In some instances, it
dismissed the case if the grounds for the decision were at all unclear.2'
In other instances, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the
case for a determination of the grounds upon which the decision
rested.22 In yet other instances, it would stay the case pending the
state court's clarification of the basis of its decision.23  Finally, in
18. It is not clear whether the traditional limitation on Supreme Court review was a self-
imposed prudential restraint or a true jurisdictional one. On rare occasions the Supreme Court
has taken the latter view:
The reason [for the limitation] is so obvious that it has rarely been thought to
warrant statement. It is found in the partitioning of power between the state and
federal judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only
power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly
adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to
revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views
of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
19. See supra note 14.
20. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
21. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1038 (citing Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52 (1934)).
The Court recognized in Lynch that the state decision could rest on federal grounds but stated
that the federal question must have been necessary and must have been actually decided by the
state court in order for it to accept review. 293 U.S. at 54. The Court added that although it
could surmise that the decision was based on federal law, "jurisdiction cannot be founded on
surmise." Id.
22. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1038-39 (citing Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309
U.S. 551 (1940)). In National Tea, the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed a case in
which the Supreme Court of Minnesota had analyzed its state constitution in general terms,
but had been specific in analyzing the federal constitution. 309 U.S. at 553. The Court stated
that if there was uncertainty as to a state court's grounds, it would require a clarification by the
state court to determine if the Court had jurisdiction. Id. at 557. The proper procedure, the
Court said, is for the case to be vacated and remanded for the state court to determine its
constitutional grounds more precisely. Id. at 556. This procedure was followed in the case of
California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), in which the Court vacated the state court judgment
and remanded the case because it was unable to determine the basis of the state court's
decision.
23. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039 (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945)).
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some instances, the Court itself examined state law to determine if
federal law was used as a guide or as the basis for the state court's
decision.24  Because the Court relied on any one of these four
approaches, its review of cases occurred on an ad hoc basis. Conse-
quently, prior to Long, the state courts lacked the power to express
opinions incorporating an analysis of federal law in a manner that
assured prevention of Supreme Court review. Instead, whenever a
state court used federal law, its opinion could be reviewed, even when
it used the federal cases only as persuasive, and not controlling,
authority.
B. Michigan v. Long
Long involved the warrantless search of an automobile. Police
officers stopped the defendant for erratic driving, and conducted a
warrantless search of the vehicle after observing a large hunting knife
on the floor on the driver's side. One of the officers noticed what later
proved to be a pouch of marijuana protruding from under the armrest
in the front seat. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence, and the Court of Appeals of Michigan
affirmed. 25 The Supreme Court of Michigan, however, reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the search violated the
fourth amendment of the Constitution of the United States as well as
article 1, section 11 of the Constitution of Michigan.26 On certiorari,
the Supreme Court of the United States held:
[W]hen, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as
The Court in Herb was concerned that if the state court reinstated its earlier decision after the
Supreme Court corrected the state court's view of federal law, it would constitute an advisory
opinion by the Supreme Court. Id. at 126. To avoid advisory opinions, the Court said that it
should withhold its decision until the state court clarifies or amends the ground on which its
decision rests. Id. at 128. This approach avoids the problem of advisory opinions and is
consistent with the respect due state supreme courts. Id.
24. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 732-33 n. l
(1983)); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1982)). In Kennedy, the Court held that
while the state and federal grounds were mixed in the state court decision, "the fact that the
state court relied to the extent it did on federal grounds requires [the Court] to reach the
merits." 456 U.S. at 671 (emphasis added).
Justice Stevens recognized these four approaches and argued that if these approaches were
rejected, then the Court would be left with two alternatives: one in favor of accepting review
and one against accepting review. Justice Stevens prefers the historical precedent of refusing
review. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25. People v. Long, 94 Mich. App. 338, 288 N.W.2d 629 (Ct. App. 1979).
26. People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982).
[Vol. 42:159
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the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the
case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it
to do so. If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal prece-
dents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it
need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opin-
ion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of
guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court
has reached.
2 7
The Court's holding created a presumption that such "blended"
state court opinions were grounded in federal law absent a clear state-
ment that state law controlled and federal law was used only for gui-
dance.28 This presumption places a burden on defendants to raise
adequate and independent state constitutional grounds if they wish to
avoid Supreme Court review in order to argue for broader rights than
those currently provided by the federal Constitution.29 Defendants,
however, cannot control whether a state court bases its decision on
state law or federal law, or some combination of the two. It is not the
defendant but the state court that must use the plain statement. The
state court has the burden of convincing the Supreme Court that state
law has controlled its decision if it wishes to avoid review of the deci-
sion by the Court. Therefore, although the defendant has the burden
of initially raising adequate and independent state grounds, only the
state court can control whether its decision will be reviewable.3°
In practice, this requirement has not placed an extensive burden
on the state courts. The Supreme Court intended that the state courts
rely on their own state law and develop it further instead of relying
solely on federal law. If the state court wishes to extend constitu-
tional protections, it should do so under its own state constitution and
accept responsibility for that extension. Instead, state courts still use
federal law as the basis for their decisions but protect these decisions
from review by use of the rubber stamp.31
Speaking for the majority in Long, Justice O'Connor expressed
discontent with the "ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve
possible adequate and independent state grounds. '3 2 She argued that
state courts were requiring the Court to interpret state law with which
it was generally unfamiliar.33 The alternatives of vacation or continu-
27. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
28. Pollock, supra note 15, at 981.
29. Id.
30. Id. (footnote omitted).
31. See infra Section IV.
32. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1039.
33. Id.
1987]
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ance for clarification created delay and inefficiency in judicial
administration.34
The majority in Long hoped that its new approach would resolve
three major concerns: First, limiting the need for interpreting state
law; 35 second, avoiding the rendition of advisory opinions; 36 and
third, conserving scarce judicial resources.37 Moreover, the stated
goal of the Court in Long was to provide "state judges with a clearer
opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal
interference, and yet ... preserve the integrity of federal law."38
This stated goal, however, could be viewed as serving a second
goal not explicitly articulated by the Court. By requiring the state
court to identify affirmatively an opinion as resting on independent
and adequate state grounds, the Court was implicitly presuming the
right to review all cases not so identified. There would thus be a sub-
stantial impact on the development of corresponding state constitu-
tional rights: either the state courts would assume ultimate
responsibility and accountability for extending those rights or they
would expose themselves to the possibility of Supreme Court review. 39
This choice, in turn, could have a stifling effect on state constitutional
protections in those states where the state court was unable or unwill-
ing to develop completely distinct state constitutional principles.
Ultimately the Supreme Court could control both the "floor" and the
"ceiling" of constitutional rights.
There is a tension between these two goals. If the underlying
purpose of the Long approach was to allow the Court greater review
and thus more control over constitutional protections, then it was
undercutting its ability to achieve this goal by encouraging state
courts to develop state constitutional law. In practice, however, the
Long approach has not resulted in state courts developing state juris-
prudence, but it has, at least in the short run, resulted in the Supreme
Court reviewing a larger number of criminal cases and, correspond-
34. Id. at 1039-40.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1040. Advisory opinion in this context is not meant to indicate the absence of a
live controversy between adverse parties. Rather, as Justice O'Connor stated, it is the
rendering of an opinion by the Supreme Court that will not have any practical effect, because
even if the Supreme Court finds that the state court decision exceeded federal constitutional
limits, the state court's decision can be sustained by the state court's claim that the controversy
was settled under state law. Id. at 1042. See also supra notes 10, 18 & 23 and accompanying
text.
37. Id. at 1042.
38. Id. at 1041.
39. See, e.g., Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986).
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ingly, exerting more control over these constitutional protections.
This increase will almost certainly be offset by the use of the rubber
stamp by those state courts that want to avoid Supreme Court review.
Justice Stevens, in a vigorous dissent, argued against the Court's
presumption favoring its jurisdiction and urged judicial restraint.4"
He argued that if the Court's earlier approaches were not viable,4'
then both stare decisis and policy concerns dictated a return to the
presumption that state law grounds are independent unless it clearly
appears otherwise.42 Apart from deference to state courts and the
avoidance of advisory opinions, Justice Stevens' major concern was
that the scarce federal judicial resources be utilized effectively.43 Jus-
tice Stevens stated that the Court should allow "other decisional bod-
ies to have the last word in legal interpretation until it is truly
necessary for [the] .. .Court to intervene.""
According to Justice Stevens, Long did not involve any depriva-
tion of the rights secured by the Constitution of the United States or
by federal statutes, and thus did not require intervention by the
Supreme Court.45 He analogized the situation to an American citizen
arrested in a foreign country who was granted greater rights than the
federal Constitution provides, and claimed that the United States
would not intervene in such a case.46 Justice Stevens concluded that
the State of Michigan, acting within its authority, had decided to set
the defendant in Long free, according to its state processes and with-
out offending any federal interest. The fact that Michigan provided
greater protection to one of its citizens than some other state might
provide, or that the Supreme Court requires nationally, was of no
concern to the Court.48 The federal Constitution establishes only the
floor of individual rights and each of the states establishes its own
40. 463 U.S. at 1065-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. The alternatives Justice Stevens refers to are, first, asking the state court directly, and
second, examining state law to determine the grounds for the decision. Id. at 1066. While
Justice Stevens finds these alternatives to be unattractive, he does not accept the Long solution
in their stead. Id.
42. Id. (citing Lynch v. New York, 293 U.S. 52 (1934)). The Court in Lynch held:
Where the judgment of the state court rests on two grounds, one involving a
federal question and the other not, or if it does not appear upon which of two
grounds the judgment was based, and the ground independent of a federal
question is sufficient in itself to sustain it, this Court will not take jurisdiction.
293 U.S. at 54-55.
43. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1067-68.
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ceiling at a height that may differ from that established by other
states.4 9 Justice Stevens therefore viewed the majority's decision in
Long as establishing the Supreme Court as the ultimate magistrate to
which states will turn when their courts have expanded rights in favor
of their citizens.5 °
Justice Stevens also criticized the majority's justification for its
expansive approach-the need to create uniformity in the interpreta-
tion and application of federal constitutional law.5 He pointed out
that the need for uniformity in the substantive application of federal
law is no less present when clearly independent and adequate state
grounds exist than when the state decision rests solely on federal
grounds.52 The federal system, however, provides for diversity.
Therefore, as long as the federal system of government recognizes the
states' sovereignty and their ability to give their citizenry greater indi-
vidual rights than the floor provided by the Constitution of the United
States, differences between the standards set by the states' constitu-
tions and those set by the federal Constitution cannot be eradicated.
Further, Justice Stevens emphasized the Court's limited jurisdiction
even in cases in which a state court incorrectly interprets federal law:
[W]e have never claimed jurisdiction to correct such errors, no
matter how egregious they may be, and no matter how much they
may thwart the desires of the state electorate. We do not sit to
expound our understanding of the Constitution to interested listen-
ers in the legal community; we sit to resolve disputes. If it is not
apparent that our views would affect the outcome of a particular
case, we cannot presume to interfere.53
Thus Justice Stevens' position suggests that the Court's presump-
tion in favor of its jurisdiction could lead to more rather than fewer
advisory opinions. The immediate practical consequences of Long
have proved this expectation to have been only partially correct.
Although the Long approach has not prevented advisory opinions, it
has given state courts the power to avoid Supreme Court review by
incorporating the rubber stamp into their decisions. 4
III. SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT CASES
The ten criminal cases discussed in this section illustrate the con-
flicts and inefficiencies remaining after Long. The majority in Long
49. Pollock, supra note 15, at 980.
50. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1070 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1071.
53. Id.
54. See infra Section IV.
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raised and addressed three major concerns: First, alleviating the need
for the Supreme Court to examine and interpret state law; second,
avoiding advisory opinions; and third, conserving scarce judicial
resources." Justice Stevens, in his dissent, added a fourth: allowing
the states to "percolate" issues. 6
The key to this debate centers on two different perceptions of the
Court's role in reviewing state decisions that involve federal rights.
Justice Stevens stated that "in reviewing the decisions of state courts,
the primary role of . . . [the Supreme] Court is to make sure that
persons who seek to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard."57
The majority, on the other hand, adopted the position that unless "the
state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alterna-
tively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds," the need to "preserve the integrity of federal law" may
require that the Court review the decision. 8 This latter standard
calls for Supreme Court review of any deviation by a state court from
federal norms and not just when the petitioner has been denied a fair
hearing in the vindication of federal rights. The Court's concerns,
however, are not promoted by the Long approach, as the following
analysis demonstrates.
A. Examination of Subsequent Cases
1. EXAMINATION OF STATE LAW
The first concern articulated in Long was that of alleviating the
need for the Court to examine state law because the Court is generally
unfamiliar with state law and it is therefore time consuming for the
Court to have to educate itself on such law.59 Additionally, there is
always the possibility that the Court might misinterpret state law.
The presumption in favor of review in cases of mixed federal and state
law was supposed to accomplish this goal, because the Court could
treat the state court decision as resting on federal law, thereby obviat-
ing the need to delve into state law. The following cases, however,
show that the Court has not always achieved this result, and that it
has examined state law, especially when it has suspected that the state
cases used to support the state court decision have themselves rested
on federal grounds.
55. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
57. 463 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1041.
59. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
1987]
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Oliver v. United States60 involved two state cases consolidated on
certiorari: United States v. Oliver6 I and Maine v. Thornton.62 Both
cases involved warrantless searches of fields located some distance
from the petitioners' residences but upon which were posted "no tres-
passing" signs. In each case, the trial court suppressed the evidence.
In United States v. Oliver, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed the federal district court's suppression of the
evidence.63 In State v. Thornton, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine ruled the other way and affirmed the trial court's decision,
holding that the search violated the fourth amendment of the Consti-
tution of the United States.64 The Supreme Court of the United States
rejected the contention that the decision in Thornton rested on ade-
quate and independent state grounds, because it found that the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine had referred only to the fourth
amendment of the federal Constitution, and that the state cases cited
by that court "construed the Federal Constitution. ' 65 These cases
thus were still fourth amendment cases and were not based on the
state constitution. The Court's decision in Oliver, therefore, suggests
that it is not enough for a state to cite state cases; the cited cases must
themselves rest on adequate and independent state grounds and not
on federal law.
A more complex case is New York v. Quarles,66 in which an
alleged rapist was apprehended in a supermarket after the victim had
informed the police both of his whereabouts and that he was armed.
When the police frisked the suspect upon his arrest, he was wearing
an empty shoulder holster. The officer asked him where the gun was
and the suspect nodded toward some empty cartons. The officer
retrieved the gun and then read the suspect his preinterrogation warn-
ings. The suspect waived his right to silence and admitted that the
gun was his. The trial court excluded the defendant's initial statement
and the gun because he had not first been given the preinterrogation
warnings. His subsequent statement was also excluded as having been
"fruit of the poisonous tree, ' 67 i.e., evidence that was excluded for
having been derived from information obtained in a prior illegal
60. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
61. 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 1168 (1983), aff'd, 466 U.S. 170
(1984).
62. 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982), cert. granted, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983), rev'd, 466 U.S. 170
(1984).
63. 686 F.2d at 361.
64. 453 A.2d at 489.
65. 466 U.S. at 175 n.5.
66. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
67. Id. at 665.
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search. The Supreme Court found that the state court had relied on
Miranda v. Arizona68 and not expressly on state law, and therefore
concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the state court decision.69
In the case below, the Court of Appeals of New York did not actually
cite Miranda or any federal law. 7° The majority cited New York
cases to rebut the dissenting judge's argument that the defendant had
not been subjected to "custodial interrogation," which was based on
Miranda and other federal cases.7 ' Only the dissent cited Miranda
and used federal cases.72
Therefore, the Supreme Court's argument that the Court of
Appeals of New York did not cite state cases and relied on Miranda is
wrong, unless the Supreme Court studied the state cases and deter-
mined that they relied on federal law.73 If the Court did conduct such
a study, however, it would defeat Long's goal of freeing the Supreme
Court from the need of examining state law. As it appears from
Quarles, in cases where the state court has not included the rubber
stamp in its decision, the Supreme Court is forced to examine state
law to decide whether this law is independent of federal law. State
court precedents used to support a state court's decision in any given
case would themselves have to be based on independent and adequate
state grounds. The Court, therefore, is not relieved of the task of
examining state law. In addition, the Court faces the problem of how
far back to trace those independent and adequate state grounds. The
question then is whether a state court decision can become rooted in
state law if it has some underlying basis in federal law. Much of state
constitutional and other law at some point relies on, or refers to, fed-
eral law. 74 Thus, the Court's desire to avoid examining state law is
not often likely to be realized in practice. Furthermore, the Court's
requirements place the state courts in the unenviable position of try-
ing to develop state constitutional principles without relying on simi-
lar, deeply rooted federal principles.
68. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
69. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 665.
70. People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982).
71. Id. at 666-67, 444 N.E.2d at 985-86, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
72. Id. at 667-71, 444 N.E.2d at 986-88, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 522-24 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 471).
73. The Court of Appeals of New York did not address any state constitutional issues on
remand, but simply remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of the
voluntariness of defendant's admissions. People v. Quarles, 63 N.Y.2d 923, 473 N.E.2d 30, 483
N.Y.S.2d 678 (1984).
74. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 39.
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2. ADVISORY OPINIONS
The entire Court is concerned with avoiding advisory opinions.7"
Advisory opinions waste judicial resources and breed disrespect for
the ability of state courts to address important issues. If the Supreme
Court reviews federal issues in a case because it believes that the state
court has based its decision on federal law, it has necessarily issued an
advisory opinion if the state court on remand reinstates its original
decision on state law grounds. At that point, the Supreme Court's
opinion has no substantive impact. The federal issue did not have to
be reached, and does not have any practical effect. The presumption
that the state court decision was based on federal grounds increases
the chance that the Court's decision will turn out to be an advisory
opinion because the presumption may have been incorrect. In prac-
tice, however, there has not been a flood of advisory opinions.76
A case which did result in an advisory opinion was Florida v.
Meyers.7 7 Meyers involved the warrantless search of a defendant's car
incident to his arrest for sexual battery.78 The police seized several
items as evidence. Another officer, again without a warrant, searched
the car approximately eight hours later and found additional evi-
dence.7 9 The trial court refused to suppress the evidence seized dur-
ing the second search.8" The Fourth District Court of Appeal of
Florida reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded, holding
that although the initial search of the car was valid, the second war-
rantless search was not.8' The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari after the Supreme Court of Florida denied the
state's petition for discretionary review.82
The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida based its reversal
of the defendant's conviction in Meyers on two grounds: First, that
the warrantless search of the automobile violated the defendant's
rights under the fourth amendment; and second, that the defendant's
counsel should have been able to cross-examine the victim regarding
her activities for the six hours prior to the crime.83 The State of Flor-
ida, as appellant, did not contest the reversal on the second ground.84
75. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
77. 466 U.S. 380 (1984).
78. Meyers v. State, 432 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
79. Id. at 98.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 99.
82. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. at 381.
83. Meyers v. State, 432 So. 2d at 99.
84. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. at 381.
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The Supreme Court of the United States held that it had the power to
review the fourth amendment issue in the case because the Florida
appellate court did not clearly declare that the state ground was the
basis for its decision. 85 The Court said that there was no danger of
issuing an advisory opinion, and that even if the state court ordered a
new trial on remand, the fourth amendment issue would still need to
be resolved. 86 The clear implication of Meyers is, therefore, that if a
case involves important federal constitutional questions, the Court
might take the case for review, and rule upon these questions even if
the state court on remand may decide the case on state law grounds.
This approach flies in the face of the Court's expressed desire to avoid
giving advisory opinions.87 In this particular case, on remand, the
Florida appellate court adopted without comment the Supreme Court
decision that the warrantless search was proper. 88
Another advisory opinion resulted in New York v. Class.89 People
v. Class,9° the case below, used both federal and state cases and held
that police officers had violated both the federal Constitution and the
Constitution of New York.91 Class involved the warrantless search of
an automobile. Two police officers had stopped the defendant for
exceeding the speed limit, and for having a cracked windshield. One
of the officers, in attempting to find the vehicle's identification
number, reached into the car and moved some papers that were
obscuring the area of the dashboard where the number was located.
The officer seized a gun protruding from underneath the driver's seat.
The defendant was arrested for the criminal possession of a weapon,
and after the trial court refused to suppress the gun as evidence, he
pleaded guilty and was convicted.92 The Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division affirmed. 93 The Court of Appeals of New
York reversed, holding that both the fourth amendment of the federal
Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Constitution of New York
prohibited the search.94
85. Id. at 381-82.
86. Id. at 382. The Court stated that the decision regarding admissibility of the evidence
would affect the trial court regardless of how the Florida appellate court ruled on remand,
because the admissibility of "critical evidence" at the new trial would still require a resolution
of the fourth amendment issue. Id.
87. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. This is the exact type of decision that the
Court attempted to avoid in Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
88. Meyers v. State, 457 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
89. 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
90. 63 N.Y.2d 491, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1984).
91. Id. at 493, 472 N.E.2d at 1010, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 182.
92. Id. at 494, 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
93. Id. at 494, 472 N.E.2d at 1011, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
94. Id. at 497, 472 N.E.2d at 1013, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
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The Supreme Court of the United States, in New York v. Class,9 5
held that there was no adequate and independent state ground for the
state court's decision because it only cited the state constitution once,
and that was in conjunction with the federal Constitution.96 Because
the opinion made use of both federal and state cases, the Court found
that it "lack[ed] the requisite 'plain statement' that it rest[ed] on state
grounds."97 The Court thus required that when both federal and state
cases are used, there must be a "plain statement" that the decision
rests on state grounds. Further, the Court found that because New
York has a general rule of not reaching a constitutional issue if statu-
tory construction can resolve the case, 98 the fact that both statutory
and constitutional grounds were discussed in the Court of Appeals
decision indicated that the statutory issue could not have resolved the
case. State law could not, therefore, have been an independent and
adequate ground for deciding this case. 99
The statute in question in Class authorizes a police officer to
demand information necessary to identify a vehicle.' ° The Court of
Appeals of New York held that the statute did not justify the officer's
intrusion into the car, and that the officer should only have demanded
that the vehicle number be uncovered, allowing the defendant to
move the papers. 1' Regardless of the Court's reasoning on New
York's policy of reaching constitutional issues, it does seem that the
interpretation of the state statute provided an "adequate and
independent" state ground within the meaning of Long, because the
Court of Appeals of New York had found that when the statute did
not justify the officer's entry into the vehicle, the nonconsensual entry
had violated the state constitution.10 2
On remand, the Court of Appeals of New York reinstated its
earlier judgment and held that it had previously found a violation of
the state constitution: "[w]here, as here, we have already held that
the State Constitution has been violated, we should not reach a differ-
ent result following reversal on Federal constitutional grounds unless
respondent demonstrates that there are extraordinary or compelling
circumstances. That showing has not been made."' 3 This position
95. 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).




100. People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d at 496, 472 N.E.2d at 1012, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
101. Id. at 497, 472 N.E.2d at 1013, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
102. Id. at 493, 472 N.E.2d at 1010, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 182.




suggests that New York courts have concluded that reference to the
state constitution should be sufficient to sustain a state court's hold-
ing, even when the decision also mentions the federal Constitution.
As seen from the discussion of Meyers and Class, the Court
requires the use of a plain statement that a state court's decision rests
on adequate and independent state grounds for that decision to be
beyond review by the Court. The Court, however, goes one step fur-
ther when there is no plain statement, and dissects the decision to
examine whether state grounds that could have supported the deci-
sion are sufficiently adequate to do so. This approach causes two
problems: First, it does not alleviate the need to examine state law;
and second, the Court risks interpreting the state decision incorrectly,
as it did in Class.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in New York v. P.J.
Video 104 on similar grounds: that the Court of Appeals of New York
only cited the New York constitution once and also mentioned the
first and fourth amendments to the federal Constitution.10 5 The
respondents in the case had been charged with violating the New
York obscenity statute after an investigator had viewed video-cassette
movies rented from the respondents' store by a member of the sher-
iff's department. The investigator executed affidavits summarizing
the movies and a warrant was issued on the basis of these affidavits.
The trial court granted the respondent's motion to suppress the seized
films. The Erie County Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court. 06 The Court of Appeals of New York, in its review of the Erie
County Court's decision, only cited the state constitution once,1"7
generally cited the Constitution of the United States once,10 8 and
mentioned the first and fourth amendments specifically one other
time. 09 The dissent in the Court of Appeals of New York opinion, on
the other hand, argued that the New York statute was passed with the
purpose of incorporating the federal standard of obscenity.110 It also
cited Long for the proposition that the majority opinion did not rest
upon adequate and independent state grounds because "application of
the statute necessarily entails interpretation of the Federal guidelines"
104. 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986).
105. Id. at 1613 n.4.
106. People v. P.J. Video, 65 N.Y.2d 566, 576, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 1127, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988,
995 (1985).
107. Id. at 569, 483 N.E.2d at 1122, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 569, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
110. Id. at 577, 483 N.E.2d at 1128, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
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because it incorporates the federal standard."'I The Supreme Court
of the United States rested its decision to review the case on the dis-
sent's argument that the statute incorporated the federal standard of
obscenity. "
2
The Court of Appeals of New York on remand addressed the
question of whether its own state constitution afforded greater protec-
tion from unlawful seizure, and determined that it did." 3 The court
explicitly stated that although the histories of the fourth amendment
to the federal Constitution and article I, section 12 of the New York
Constitution supported uniformity in interpretation, the state had
adopted independent standards and had rejected good faith excep-
tions to the warrant requirement.' ' The Court of Appeals of New
York reinstated its original judgment and held that there was an
insufficient showing of probable cause to have justified issuing the
warrant. "15 Again, the subsequent action of a state court rendered a
Supreme Court decision advisory.
A state court will not always, however, reinstate its original opin-
ion and thus render the Supreme Court's decision advisory."' In
some cases, courts will defer to the Supreme Court's ruling, as in Ohio
v. Johnson. " 7 Johnson concerned a double jeopardy claim, the defend-
ant having been indicted on one count each of murder, involuntary
manslaughter, aggravated robbery and grand theft. At the arraign-
ment hearing, an Ohio trial judge accepted his guilty pleas to involun-
tary manslaughter and grand theft and granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss the remaining charges, to which the defendant had
pleaded not guilty. " I The Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed the trial
court's decision." 9 On appeal by the State of Ohio, the Supreme
Court of Ohio affirmed the trial court's decision and held that prose-
cution for murder and aggravated robbery was barred by the double
jeopardy provisions of the federal and state constitutions. 2° The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and held that
111. Id.
112. New York v. P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1614.
113. People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1301 (1987).
114. Id. at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
115. Id. at 309, 501 N.E.2d at 564, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
116. As discussed earlier, in Meyers v. State, 457 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), the
Florida court simply adopted the Supreme Court's decision without comment. See supra note
88 and accompanying text.
117. 467 U.S. 493 (1984).





the Supreme Court of Ohio had not articulated an independent state
ground for its decision.' 2 ' The fact that the Supreme Court of Ohio
had cited federal cases indicated to the Court that the decision rested
on federal law:
Although the court's reference to double jeopardy might arguably
be to the Ohio version .... the failure to indicate clearly that the
state double jeopardy protection was being invoked, when coupled
with the references in the opinion to our decisions in North Caro-
lina v. Pierce and Ashe v. Swenson, convinces us that the Ohio
Supreme Court based its decision on its interpretation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 22
Justice Stevens dissented and concluded that the decision below
did rest on adequate and independent state grounds, and that the
"Court's cavalier disregard for the state-law basis for this aspect of
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is totally unprece-
dented."' 23  The Ohio Court of Appeals, however, on remand,
adopted the Supreme Court's ruling.
24
In summary, although there has not been the flood of advisory
opinions that Justice Stevens feared, there have nonetheless been some
cases in which a state court has reinstated its original decision on state
law grounds after the Supreme Court decided the issue on federal
grounds. This outcome rendered the Court's decisions in these cases
advisory. The Court, therefore, has not met its goal of eliminating
such advisory opinions.
3. SCARCE JUDICIAL RESOURCES
An issue closely related to the Court's concern with issuing advi-
sory opinions is the need to conserve judicial resources. 2 The con-
cern is that even if a Supreme Court opinion is not advisory when
pronounced, when a state court reinstates its original decision on state
law grounds, the Supreme Court decision might have no practical
effect and therefore be an unwise use of the Court's resources. Addi-
tionally, even if the state court decisions do rest on federal grounds,
Justice Stevens argues that there is still no need to review the cases as
long as some state basis is present and as long as the state does not
drop below the federal floor of individual rights.'26 To conserve judi-
121. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 497 n.7.
122. Id. (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. State v. Johnson, No. 11-027, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 1985).
125. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
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cial resources, and to avoid the possible consequence of fostering dis-
respect for state court decisions, Justice Stevens proposes that the
Court should only interfere to vindicate federal rights. 
27
California v. Ramos 28 was among the first cases to apply Long
explicitly. The defendant had been sentenced to death following his
conviction for the murder of one employee and the attempted murder
of another during the robbery of a fast-food restaurant. The decision
of the Supreme Court of California considered the constitutionality of
a California statute that required the jury sitting for the penalty phase
of a bifurcated capital trial to be instructed regarding the Governor's
power to commute a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility
of parole to a sentence that includes the possibility of parole.' 29 The
trial court gave the instruction as required and the jury sentenced the
defendant to death. 3 ° The Supreme Court of California, on direct
appeal, reversed the trial court and held that the statute violated the
defendant's due process rights under the fourteenth amendment. 1 '
The court declined, however, to decide whether the California consti-
tution was also violated.
3 2
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Supreme
Court of California, holding that although it was possible that the
California constitution was also violated, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia rested its decision solely on the federal Constitution.' 33 The
Court, however, pointed out that "States are free to provide greater
protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitu-
tion requires."' 34 On remand, the Supreme Court of California pro-
ceeded to determine the statute's validity under the state constitution
and decided to afford greater protection by holding that the jury
instruction violated the state constitution. 3 '
Although the Supreme Court of California had failed to base its
original decision on state law, Justice Stevens argued in his dissent
that the Court still should not have granted certiorari. 3 6 He did not
127. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
128. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
129. People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 562, 639 P.2d 908, 912, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 270
(1982).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 600, 639 P.2d at 936, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
132. Id.
133. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 997.
134. Id. at 1014.
135. People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 143, 689 P.2d 430, 432, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802
(1983). The Supreme Court of California stated that the instruction was misleading and
invited the jury to consider speculative matters, and thus violated the defendant's due process
rights. Id. at 154, 689 P.2d at 440, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
136. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1029 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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think that the case had enough of a national impact to justify using
the Court's scarce judicial resources.
137
Even if one were to agree with the Court's conclusion that the
instruction does not violate the defendant's procedural rights, it
would nevertheless be fair to ask what harm would have been done
to the administration of justice by state courts if the California
court had been left undisturbed in its determination.
1 38
Justice Stevens argued, without further explanation, that "noth-
ing more than an interest in facilitating the imposition of the death
penalty in California justified" the majority's grant of review. 139 And,
although the position taken by the Supreme Court of California was
consistent with that adopted by many other states, no other state
would have been bound by the California precedent because the jury
instruction at issue was based on California state law.'
40
As the Ramos case indicates, redundancy and waste of judicial
resources can result when a state court decides an issue first on federal
constitutional grounds and, when reversed by the Supreme Court,
reinstates its original decision on the basis of state law. Under the
majority's analysis in Long, a state court can prevent a dissipation of
the Court's judicial resources by deciding the issue first under state
law when it is possible to do so. Because there is no way to impose
such a responsibility on the state courts, the Supreme Court should
exercise its discretion and not grant review of cases in which the
extension of federally protected rights is minor or will not have a
broad impact. The alternative carries the risk that the state court may
simply reinstate its original decision on state law grounds. Although
the state court did ultimately undertake a deeper analysis of state law
on remand in Ramos, there is no guarantee that such scrutiny will
ensue, and the Court's review of such cases may result in unnecessary
review at the Supreme Court level combined with a lack of a more
complete analysis at the state level.
Justice Stevens was particularly concerned about the Court's use
of scarce judicial resources and discussed this concern in Florida v.
Meyers: '
4 1
[I]f we take it upon ourselves to review and correct every incorrect
disposition of a federal question by every intermediate state appel-
late court, we will soon become so busy that we will either be
unable to discharge our primary responsibilities effectively, or else
137. Id. at 1029-30.
138. Id. at 1030.
139. Id. at 1031.
140. Id.
141. 466 U.S. 380 (1984).
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be forced to make still another adjustment in the size of our staff in
order to process cases effectively. We should focus our attention
on methods of using our scarce resources wisely rather than laying
another course of bricks in the building of a federal judicial
bureaucracy. 142
Further, Justice Stevens argued that the central purpose of the
federal Constitution is to vindicate federal rights. 43 He viewed the
majority, on the other hand, as being more concerned with imposing
its will and "less interested in its role as a protector of the individual's
constitutional rights."'" Justice Stevens pointed to nineteen cases
decided by summary disposition in the 1981 term in which the prose-
cution obtained reversals of decisions upholding constitutional
rights. 45 In contrast, he noted that during the past two and one-half
terms the Court had not "employ[ed] its discretionary power of sum-
mary disposition in order to uphold a claim of constitutional
right."' 46 Thus, in addition to his concern regarding the unwise use
of the Court's resources, Justice Stevens is also concerned that the
Court is exercising its review power in order to constrain constitu-
tional protections rather than to vindicate them.
State courts can do much to conserve judicial resources, and the
primary responsibility of preventing unnecessary review of state cases
by the Court rests upon the state courts. This point is illustrated by
Massachusetts v. Upton,"4 a case in which the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts based its decision on the fourth amendment. Upton
concerned the search of a motor home pursuant to a search warrant.
The police had received a tip from the defendant's ex-girlfriend that
stolen items were hidden in the motor home and on this basis had
142. Id. at 385 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 386. Justice Stevens' view of the majority's concern supports the contention that
the Burger Court attempted to limit the federal constitutional rights that had been broadened
by the Warren Court. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
145. Id. at 386 n.3. Justice Stevens cited the following cases: Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S.
114 (1983) (per curiam); Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78 (1983) (per curiam); California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam); Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 (1983) (per
curiam); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983) (per curiam); Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S.
571 (1983) (per curiam); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (per curiam); Anderson v.
Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (per curiam); United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S.
263 (1982) (per curiam); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982) (per curiam); Fletcher v.
Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (per curiam);
Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (per curiam); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982)
(per curiam); Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981) (per curiam); Leeke v. Timmerman, 454
U.S. 83 (1981) (per curiam); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981) (per curiam); Duckworth
v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam).
146. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. at 386.
147. 466 U.S. 727 (1983).
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obtained the warrant. The trial court allowed the items to be received
into evidence. 48 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed the trial court's order and held that the issuance of the war-
rant violated the fourth amendment because there was an insufficient
showing of probable cause. 4 9 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States, Justice Stevens pointed out that deciding the case
on fourth amendment grounds without analyzing it under state law
increased the burden on both the state courts and the Supreme
Court. 5 ° On remand to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, the state court would have to "review the probable-cause issue
once again and decide whether or not a violation of the state constitu-
tional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures ha[d]
occurred." 5' If the state court decided that the state constitution was
violated, the Supreme Court opinion would be redundant. If the state
constitution was not violated, the issue still could have been resolved
at the state level by the state courts expressly undertaking an analysis
of state law.' 52
Justice Stevens rightly believes that it is important that the state
courts "do not unnecessarily invite th[e] Court to undertake review
of state-court judgments."' 53 State constitutional protections are
"disparaged" when state courts "refuse[] to adjudicate their very
existence because of the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitu-
tion of the United States."' 54 Reiterating that a state may offer
greater constitutional protections to its citizens than those afforded by
the federal Constitution,'55 Justice Stevens went further and asserted
that such an extension of rights is a duty of the state courts: "The
States in our federal system ... remain the primary guardian of the
liberty of the people. The Massachusetts court, I believe, ignored this
fundamental premise of our constitutional system of government. In
doing so, it made an ill-advised entry into the federal domain."'5 6
Thus, although asserting that the Supreme Court should exercise its
discretion to decline to review cases in which the state courts grant
broader individual protections than provided by the federal Constitu-
tion, Justice Stevens places primary responsibility for avoiding
Supreme Court review upon the state courts.
148. Id. at 729.
149. Id. at 730.
150. Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 458 N.E.2d 717 (1983).
151. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. at 735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 735-36.
153. Id. at 737.
154. Id. at 738.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 739.
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took Justice Ste-
vens' advice on remand and held that a state statutory exclusionary
rule applied to evidence that was seized without a showing of prob-
able cause.' 57 The court also held that the Constitution of Massachu-
setts requires a stricter test to determine probable cause than the
federal Constitution does,' 58 thereby "providing more substantive
protection to criminal defendants than does the fourth amendment in
the determination of probable cause."' 59
It is clear that the Massachusetts court's initial failure to use a
state ground in Upton resulted in the delivery of an unnecessary opin-
ion by the Supreme Court of the United States. Had the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court held at first, as it did on remand, that its
constitution had been violated, the federal issue need never have been
reached, and the judicial resources expended in review by the Court,
and on remand at the state level, could have been conserved.
Cases such as Upton justify Justice Stevens' concern that the
Supreme Court is accepting unnecessary review of state cases that
grant greater constitutional protections than would be available under
the federal Constitution. Such cases strengthen his argument that the
Court is wasting precious judicial resources by undertaking review.
This position, however, does not answer the argument that an under-
lying purpose of the Long approach might have been to allow the
Court to accept review of criminal cases in which state courts have
extended constitutional protections, in order to constrain or reduce
the expansion of these rights. If that premise is accepted as a valid
one, it is no longer a waste of judicial resources to accept cases in
which a defendant is granted greater constitutional protections,
because the Court may narrow at least the federal basis for the rights
at issue.
4. THE PERCOLATION OF ISSUES
The majority's opinions in the cases discussed above have not
dealt directly with "percolation" of issues."' Percolation allows the
Supreme Court to address issues with the assurance that these issues
have been adequately explored and debated over time in state courts
and lower federal courts. Percolation also shows the Supreme Court's
confidence in, and respect for, the ability of the lower courts and state
courts to debate and refine important issues of law. This considera-
157. Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 364, 476 N.E.2d 548, 550 (1985).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 373, 476 N.E.2d at 556.
160. See supra notes 35-37, 55 & 56 and accompanying text.
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tion ties in directly with the prudential concern of conserving scarce
judicial resources. By accepting review of cases that have not been
exhaustively debated and digested over a period of time, the Court
may be reaching issues that may not necessarily be ready, or appropri-
ate, for the Court's consideration. 6'
In People v. Carney,62 the Supreme Court of California discussed
the state constitution's provision against unlawful search and seizure,
and, citing both state and federal cases, found that its protection was
similar to that provided by the fourth amendment. Carney involved
the warrantless search of a motor home by agents of the Drug
Enforcement Agency. The Supreme Court of California found that
the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment did not apply.' 6 3 The Supreme Court of the United
States granted review and reversed the decision of the Supreme Court
of California in California v. Carney,164 finding that the case below
rested on federal grounds.
65
Justice Stevens dissented, stating that "[p]remature resolution of
the novel question presented has stunted the natural growth and
refinement of alternative principles.' 66 He stated that the Court's
recent trend in accepting petitions for certiorari displayed a lack of
confidence in the state courts' ability to interpret the fourth amend-
ment. 167 The Court's willingness to accept such petitions had, in turn,
''emboldened state legal officers to file petitions for certiorari from
state court suppression orders that are explicitly based on independ-
ent state grounds."'' 6 Additionally, he accused the Court of promot-
ing itself as the "High Magistrate for every warrantless search and
seizure" and burdening "the [Court's] argument docket with cases
presenting fact-bound errors of minimal significance."'' 69 Justice Ste-
161. While Justice Stevens calls this issue a "percolation" issue, it shares similarities with
"ripeness" analysis.
162. 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1983).
163. Id. at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
164. 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
165. Id. at 389 n.I.
166. Id. at 399 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens pointed out that the Court had no
prior cases dealing with "hybrids" such as motor homes and thus could not fully contemplate
all the future complexities such cases could raise. Id.
167. Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 396 n.4. As authority for this proposition, Justice Stevens cited Jamison v. State,
455 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985); Ex parte Gannaway,
448 So. 2d 413 (Ala. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985); State v. Burkholder, 12 Ohio St.
3d 205, 466 N.E.2d 176, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20
(Colo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984).
169. 471 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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vens pointed out that by accepting review, the Court was giving
national effect to a case of local significance: "If the Court had merely
allowed the decision below to stand, it would have only governed
searches of those vehicles in a single State. The breadth of this
Court's mandate counsels greater patience before we offer our binding
judgment on the meaning of the Constitution."' ° Justice Stevens'
concern is that resolving the issue in the "vacuum of the first case
raising the issue" does not allow an issue to be sufficiently
percolated. 1
7 1
Justice Stevens has argued that disagreement among the lower
courts percolates an issue by allowing time for "exploratory consider-
ation and experimentation by lower courts before the Supreme Court
ends the process with a nationally binding rule."' 7 2 Even when the
Court could accept review, therefore, it should not unless the issue has
been well litigated in the lower courts.
Delaware v. Van Arsdall "I is not, strictly speaking, a percolation
case. It does, however, encompass many of the same concerns, espe-
cially those concerning the respect owed to a state court. Justice Ste-
vens argued that the issues involved in Van Arsdall were issues that
the state should be allowed to resolve as a matter of deciding whether
or not to extend the protections of its state constitution.' 7 4 The issue,
according to Justice Stevens, was not of significant national impact to
merit the attention of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Van Arsdall concerned a Delaware trial court's refusal to allow
170. Id. at 399. Justice Stevens quoted from a study on the Supreme Court:
[T]he Court should not hear cases in which a state court has invalidated state
action on a federal ground in the absence of a conflict or a decision to treat the
case as a vehicle for a major pronouncement of federal law. Without further
percolation, there is ordinarily little reason to believe that the issue is one of
recurring national significance. In general, correction of error, even regarding a
matter of constitutional law, is not a sufficient basis for Supreme Court
intervention. This last category differs from a federal court's invalidation of state
action in that a structural justification for intervention is generally missing, given
the absence of vertical federalism difficulties and the built-in assurance that state
courts functioning under significant political constraints are not likely to
invalidate state action lightly, even on federal grounds .... [The Court] should
not grant . . . [review] merely to correct perceived error.
Id. (quoting Estreicher & Sexton, New York University Supreme Court Project, A Managerial
Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibility: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 677,
738-39 (1984)). The same concerns are the subject of an article written by a retired chief
justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See Roberts, The Adequate and Independent
State Ground. Some Practical Considerations, IJA REP. Winter 1985, at 1-2.
171. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. at 399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 400 n.l I (citing Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 170, at 716).
173. 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
174. Id. at 1450 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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defense counsel to cross-examine a prosecution witness about an
agreement the latter had made with the prosecutor. The witness had
agreed to speak with the prosecutor about the murder of which the
defendant was accused and of which the witness had information, in
exchange for the dismissal of an unrelated criminal charge against the
witness. The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed, holding that the
trial court improperly restricted defense counsel's attempt to show
bias on the part of the witness, and that such a restriction violated the
confrontation clause of the federal Constitution.'75 The Supreme
Court of the United States stated that it granted review because the
decision below had applied both federal and state cases and did not
contain a plain statement that the decision rested on state grounds.1
76
Further, the state decision did not cite a "state prophylactic rule
designed to insure protection for a federal constitutional right," and
thus it rested on federal law.17 7  The case was remanded to the
Supreme Court of Delaware to enable it to apply the "harmless error"
rule to the trial court's improper denial of the defendant's opportunity
to impeach a witness for bias.
17 1
On remand, the Supreme Court of Delaware focused "solely on
the defendant's rights under the Delaware constitution and other state
law."' 179 It added that although it had cited significant rulings of fed-
eral courts in its original opinion, it did not base its decision on fed-
eral law.' 0 The court also said that it did "not choose to set forth at
this time a rule of procedure requiring a particular sequence of analy-
sis with respect to issues arguably controlled by the State or Federal
constitutions."'' The Supreme Court of Delaware, therefore, not
only declined the Supreme Court's invitation to apply the harmless-
error rule, but also ignored the Court's implied demand that it
develop a state prophylactic rule.
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the case involved the
state's remedy for a federal constitutional violation and that the Court
should not presume jurisdiction to review a state remedy because state
courts "have traditionally enjoyed broad discretion to fashion reme-
dies" once a constitutional violation has been proved. I82 In Justice
175. Id. at 1434.
176. Id. at 1435 n.3.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1434.
179. Van Arsdall v. State, No. 346, 1982, at 2 (Del. Sup. Ct. April 20, 1987).
180. Id. at 7.
181. Id.
182. 106 S. Ct. at 1441 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens added that "federal law
does not require a state appellate court to make a harmless-error determination; it merely
permits the state court to do so in appropriate cases." Id. at 1442 n.3.
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Stevens' opinion, "the Court's willingness to presume jurisdiction to
review state remedies evidences a lack of respect for state courts and
will ... be a recurrent source of friction between the federal and state
judiciaries."' z Justice Stevens reiterated that federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, and that the Supreme Court should not
reach a constitutional issue if there is another basis for its decision. 84
Although Justice Stevens acknowledged that the Court follows these
tenets in reviewing federal cases, he did not believe it treated state
courts with similar respect:
[T]he Court has taken a different stance when it is asked to review
cases coming to us from state courts. Although "[w]e cannot per-
form our duty to refrain from interfering in state law questions and
also to review federal ones without making a determination
whether the one or the other controls the judgment," Herb v. Pit-
cairn,. . . the jurisdictional precepts that serve us so well in review-
ing judgments rendered in federal court merit observance in review
of state court judgments too. Abjuring the federal analogy, the
Court unwisely marks for special scrutiny the decisions of courts to
which I believe it owes special respect."5
Justice Stevens was concerned that the Court's expansion of its
"review of state remedies that over-compensate for violations of fed-
eral constitutional rights"'8 6 would lead to judicial waste, advisory
opinions and friction between the state and federal judiciaries:
The presumption applied today allocates the risk of error in favor
of the Court's power of review; as a result, over the long run the
Court will inevitably review judgments that in fact rest on ade-
quate and independent state grounds. Even if the Court is uncon-
cerned by the waste inherent in review of such cases, even if it is
unmoved by the incongruity between the wholly precatory nature
of our pronouncements on such occasions and .. .[Article] III's
prohibition of advisory opinions, it should be concerned by the
inevitable intrusion upon the prerogatives of state courts that can
only provide a potential source of friction and thereby threaten to
undermine the respect on which we must depend for the faithful
and conscientious application of this Court's expositions of federal
law. 187
Justice Stevens concluded that the interests of the independent
role of state constitutions and state courts can only be protected if
both the state courts and the Supreme Court respect "[t]he emerging
183. Id. at 1442.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1443 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 1444.
187. Id. at 1446 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 42:159
MICHIGAN v. LONG
preference for state [constitutional] bases of decision in lieu of federal
ones .... "188 Thus, Justice Stevens' concern is not only with judicial
efficiency and advisory opinions, but also with the respect owed to
state courts by the federal courts. Although this concern was shared
by the majority in Long, it does not appear to have been put into
practice by the Court.
89
B. The Impact of Michigan v. Long
The majority in Long stated that its decision would free states to
develop their own state constitutional law.' 9° This result, however,
has not yet been achieved in the majority of the cases. On remand by
the Supreme Court of the United States, some state courts agreed that
they were citing federal law. Such courts did not attempt to develop
their own state law. 19' Others followed the Supreme Court without
comment.'92 Only a few state courts have truly developed state con-
stitutional precedents that are detached from the federal realm.
93
Despite the continuing dependence of many state courts on fed-
eral guidance, Justice Stevens consistently has argued against review
in each of the cases in which the Court granted review expressly on
Long's authority. His concern that the state courts on remand would
render the Supreme Court's decisions advisory has in fact been real-
ized in some cases.' 94 In addition, some of the state court decisions
on remand show that these courts may have perceived the Court's
acceptance of review as showing a lack of respect and confidence in
the state courts. Finally, Justice Stevens' concern that the Supreme
Court's scarce resources would be wasted has come to be realized, as
188. Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040.
190. Id. at 1041.
191. See, e.g., People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982);
State v. Thornton, 485 A.2d 952 (Me. 1984); People v. Quarles, 63 N.Y.2d 923, 473 N:E.2d 30,
483 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1984).
192. See, e.g., Meyers v. State, 457 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1984).
193. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985); People v.
Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986); People v. P.J. Video, 65
N.Y.2d 566, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1985). It is interesting to note, however,
that in People v. Quarles, 63 N.Y.2d 923, 473 N.E.2d 30, 483 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1984), the New
York court did not attempt to develop its state law. See supra note 191 and accompanying
text. New York may thus be moving to a greater reliance on its state constitution, although it
is probably still too early to say so with confidence.
194. Advisory opinions were entered in three of the cases discussed in this Note, in which
the state court reinstated its original judgment. See supra note 193.
195. This perception is also possible in cases in which the courts simply accepted the
Supreme Court's decision without comment. Because the courts did not write an opinion, one
cannot tell if they based their decisions on federal law or were simply deferring to the Supreme
Court. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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seen from the reinstated judgments. 96
On the other hand, the flood of advisory opinions that Justice
Stevens anticipated from Long has not materialized. In the ten cases
discussed above, the Supreme Court expressly cited Long in support
of its presumption that the state court's decision rested on federal
grounds. Long has also often been used by state courts, however, as a
rubber stamp to avoid Supreme Court review.' 97 Therefore, although
some of Justice Stevens' concerns have come to be realized, this analy-
sis also shows that the state courts can manipulate the Long approach
and bend it to their own advantage. The Long approach allows state
courts to decide state constitutional issues unimpeded by federal
review. 198 Yet it only requires the state court to say explicitly that it
is deciding a case on independent and adequate state grounds. The
stage may thus have been set for a transition from a federally domi-
nated era of constitutional protections to one in which the state courts
play a more prominent role.
IV. STATE REACTION TO Michigan v. Long
Traditionally state courts have adopted one of three practical
methods of analyzing constitutional claims. The first approach has
been called the "dual reliance" method,' 99 under which the state
court analyzes the case in terms of both federal and state constitu-
tional claims.200 The second method is what some commentators
196. See supra note 186.
197. See infra Section IV.
198. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
199. See Pollock, supra note 15, at 983.
200. Some writers have emphasized that dual reliance may easily be abused by state courts
that rely on both constitutions in effect to shield their decisions from review. See Deukmejian
& Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 996-97 (1979).
Of the seventeen states surveyed in this Note, none seemed to have demonstrated a pure
dual reliance approach. Although most of the states had dealt with both the state and federal
constitutions to varying degrees, all of them emphasized one constitution over the other in
their analyses. To the extent that the dual reliance method has been abandoned, the Long
approach does serve the majority's concern for judicial efficiency. See Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. at 1041. It is certain that the application of the rubber stamp to a state opinion
subordinates the federal Constitution and forces a court at least in form to appear to be
deciding the case based on its state constitution. At one time or another, all of the state courts
surveyed in this study placed in their opinions the declaration that their decisions rested on
bona fide, separate, adequate and independent state grounds. And in all cases the Supreme
Court denied review. See Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The
Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1171 (1985). But was it the
intention of Long to require merely a one sentence disclaimer? Or was the Supreme Court
expecting that the Long approach would encourage states to present an analysis of their
decision that rested on state concerns and principles? As we have seen in the states applying
the interstitial approach and as we will see in the states applying the primacy approach, most
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refer to as the "supplemental" or "interstitial" approach. 20 ' Under
this approach, the state court will look at federal constitutional law
first and will only look at state constitutional law if it finds that the
floor provided by the federal Constitution was not violated. Finally
there is the "primacy" approach,2"2 under which the state court will
look at its own constitutional law first. If this law provides protection
to the individual, the court will not consider the federal Constitution.
A state court's application of one of these approaches as opposed
to the others will affect the degree of analysis it gives to state constitu-
tional law. The interstitial model always places state constitutional
law as a secondary source. Although it may be sensible and efficient
for a state to apply federal law when this law clearly provides deci-
sional principles, to do so on a systematic basis results in state courts
forcing federal principles to fit every situation and a consequent
neglect of available state principles. On the other hand, the applica-
tion of the primacy model requires state courts to look to state princi-
ples first, thus increasing the chances that the court will undertake a
truly adequate analysis of state principles. This approach in turn
diminishes the likelihood of Supreme Court review and thereby
achieves the stated goals of Long. Professor Pollock has noted that:
"This model avoids entanglement with federal law and also avoids
United States Supreme Court review because of the failure to state an
adequate and independent state ground."20 3 As this Note discusses,
however, there has been less than unanimous adoption of the primacy
approach.204  Even if the primacy approach has been adopted, the
state supreme court can still reach its decision without taking mean-
ingful steps toward developing state constitutional law. Although this
section discusses the failure of Long to achieve its goal with respect to
state constitutional independence, it is not intended as an endorse-
ment of that goal. We wish only to emphasize at this point the inabil-
states are not truly applying principled analysis to their state constitutional decisions. See, e.g.,
People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20 (Colo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); State v. Fleming, 198
Conn. 255, 502 A.2d 886, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1797 (1986); State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530,
482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985); Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713
(Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1221 (1985).
201. Pollock, supra note 15, at 984; Abrahamson, supra note 200, at 1171.
202. Pollock, supra note 15, at 983.
203. Id.
204. Undoubtedly, in cases in which federal law is reasonably clear, the state court can rely
on it regardless of the approach taken. This discussion focuses on the analytical approach
taken by a state court and not the ultimate decision that it may reach in a given case. The
adoption of the primacy model does not mean that there must be a complete abandonment of
federal principles. As discussed below, however, a controlled primacy approach may better
serve both state constitutional development and the continuing application of federal principles
when appropriate. See infra notes 236-50 and accompanying text.
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ity of a rubber stamp requirement to encourage states uniformly to
apply a single mode of analysis.
A. The Supplemental Approach
If the three approaches to analyzing constitutional claims are
placed on a continuum of state constitutional activism, the supple-
mental or interstitial approach would be at the lowest level of state
activism, the primacy approach would be at the highest level and the
dual reliance approach would fall somewhere in between. Of the sev-
enteen states surveyed in this Note that applied the rubber stamp to
their opinions, most still cling to an almost complete reliance on fed-
eral law.2°5
New Jersey recently used what in substance was an interstitial
method in reversing a conviction because of a violation of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 2°6 This case involved
a failure by FBI agents to readminister Miranda warnings before
reinterrogating a defendant who had previously invoked his right to
remain silent. 207 The Supreme Court of New Jersey spent the first
seventeen pages of its opinion interpreting the fifth amendment and
making predictions of how the Supreme Court of the United States
would rule on the issue. 2 8 The Supreme Court of New Jersey said it
"sought to follow [the Supreme Court] faithfully, not to write new
law.,,
20 9
205. The cases from the seventeen states analyzed in this Note were obtained by identifying
all state court opinions that refer to Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1984). The following
cases were decided in jurisdictions that apply the interstitial model: Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d
1156 (Alaska 1985); State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985); People v. Hill, 37 Cal. 3d 491,
691 P.2d 989, 209 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1984); Oldham v. State, 179 Ga. App. 730, 347 S.E.2d 698
(Ct. App. 1986); Hubbard v. State, 176 Ga. App. 622, 337 S.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1983); State v.
Otiz, 67 Haw. 181, 683 P.2d 822 (1984); People v. Tisler, 103 Il. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147
(1984); People v. Chapman, 392 Mich. 691, 222 N.W.2d 749 (1986); Stringer v. State, 491 So.
2d 837 (Miss. 1986); Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1984); State v. Hartley, 103 N.J.
252, 511 A.2d 80 (1986); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 348 Pa. Super. 306, 502 A.2d 221 (Super.
Ct. 1985).
The following cases were decided in jurisdictions that apply the primacy model: State v.
Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 724 P.2d 545 (1986); Large v. Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 229, 714 P.2d
399 (1986); State v. Fleming, 198 Conn. 255, 502 A.2d 886 (1986); State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn.
219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985); State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 482 A.2d 300 (1984); People v.
Corr, 682 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1984); State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339 (Me. 1985); State v. Ball, 124
N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983); State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996 (1983); State v.
Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808
(1986).
206. State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 511 A.2d 80 (1986).
207. Id. at 255, 511 A.2d at 83.
208. Id. at 284, 511 A.2d at 97.
209. Id.
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey said that it was only the
absence of a Supreme Court decision squarely on point that "com-
pelled" it by principles of sound jurisprudence to look to state law.21°
There was no ardent desire expressed by the court to develop its own
constitution but only a fear of Supreme Court review: "Failure to set
forth clearly the independent state-law basis for a decision in a case in
which federal constitutional law is also involved can lead to needless
review in the United States Supreme Court, and could in fact require,
in some cases, subsequent redundant proceedings in our own
courts."21 The New Jersey court did no more than base its decision
alternatively "on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds," followed by a one paragraph endorsement of the privilege
against self-incrimination in New Jersey.212 This minimal analysis
could hardly be characterized as an in-depth development of state
constitutional law.213
Illinois courts read that state's constitution even more narrowly
to require parallel interpretations if parallel language exists in the fed-
eral Constitution and the Illinois Constitution. In People v. Tisler,214
the defendant claimed that the police lacked probable cause to make a
warrantless arrest and that, therefore, the trial court should have
excluded the drugs seized during the search of the defendant incident
to his arrest.2"5 The Supreme Court of Illinois applied a strict intersti-
tial approach to find that the evidence used against the defendant did
not violate either the fourth amendment to the federal Constitution or
article 1, section 6 of its state constitution.21 6 The court discussed
extensively how the delegates, in drafting section 6 of the state Bill of
Rights, did not intend to confer rights and protections beyond those
given under the fourth amendment.217 Justice Clark, in his concur-
rence, agreed with the ultimate result but did not believe there needed
to be a complete surrender of the state constitution to the interpreta-
tion by the Supreme Court.218 The Justice directed his concerns not at
the case at hand, but at possible future ramifications: "Although the
majority's reasoning may seem harmless today, it would preclude this
court from protecting the individual liberties of Illinois citizens
210. Id.
211. Id. at 285-86, 511 A.2d at 97-98.
212. Id. at 256, 511 A.2d at 84.
213. For purposes of analysis the states have been broadly categorized under one of the two
approaches based on a limited sample. See supra note 205.
214. 103 III. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984).
215. Id. at 243, 469 N.E.2d at 152.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 241-42, 469 N.E.2d at 155-56.
218. Id. at 258, 469 N.E.2d at 163.
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should such protection become essential in the future. ' 21 9 Because
this restriction is self-imposed, the Illinois court theoretically would
be able to free itself from this limitation in the future.
State courts may follow the supplemental model because, by sub-
ordinating their constitutions to the federal Constitution, they are
serving the nation as a whole by not departing from federally estab-
lished principles. 220 This argument is buttressed by the fact that an
increasingly mobile population needs to rely on uniform principles. A
state court interpreting only its own constitution, however, cannot
assure that any other state will also interpret its constitution consist-
ently and uniformly with the federal Constitution. The Supreme
Court in Long makes clear that even if state courts were able to
achieve uniformity, our system of federalism does not mandate uni-
formity of constitutional principles.221 It is, therefore, neither feasible
nor expected that state courts, through their state constitutions, will
achieve national uniformity of constitutional principles.
Not even the push from the Supreme Court of the United States
has swayed these state courts. For the states that follow the intersti-
tial model, Justice O'Connor's rule in Long, that state courts shape
their opinions so that they rest on independent and adequate state
grounds, is no more than a formalistic requirement. The substance of
the opinions has not changed and the majority of the state court opin-
ions continue to demonstrate a reliance on federal precedent, and
merely expand on what the Supreme Court already has said. The
absence of substance means that we still have states that only echo the
Supreme Court's voice. It is, therefore, improper to conclude that the
void left by the Burger Court in the area of individual rights will natu-
rally be filled by state courts under their own constitutions. The
Supreme Court must realize that in many states the retreat in individ-
ual protections at the federal level will mean no additional protection
above the floor. As far as these states are concerned, the Supreme
Court is setting both the constitutional floor and ceiling.
B. The Primacy Approach
As a point of departure in discussing the primacy approach it
should be noted that there are many different applications of this
approach. Practical applications of this approach range from state
courts delegating to counsel the responsibility for distinguishing the
219. Id. at 259, 469 N.E.2d at 164.
220. Pollock, supra note 15, at 986.
221. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
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state constitutional issues from federal law issues,12 2 to state courts
assuming primary responsibility for all civil liberties.223
In following the primacy approach in State v. Jewett,224 the
Supreme Court of Vermont declined to address state constitutional
questions because the issues were not adequately briefed by counsel.
The court said that it was the duty of the attorneys to raise state con-
stitutional issues at the trial level and then develop them on appeal.225
The defendant had appealed his conviction on the ground that he was
stopped and arrested in violation of his state constitutional rights.2 26
Only after the attorneys had adequately identified state constitutional
issues would the Supreme Court of Vermont address them. Neverthe-
less, the court emphasized that textual differences between the Ver-
mont and the federal constitutions created the possibility that the two
constitutions could be construed differently. According to the court,
the "imaginative lawyer" bears the bulk of the burden for developing
sound state constitutional law.227
Even among the states that have applied state constitutional
principles, many have failed to enunciate their criteria for deciding
when it is appropriate for state courts to apply state constitutions.228
Thus, in State v. Lowry,22 9 the Supreme Court of Oregon relied exclu-
sively on its state law, and said that the court would not be tied to
222. State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985).
223. State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985).
224. 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985).
225. Id. at 229, 500 A.2d at 238.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). The court said that in
order to ensure that a party that invokes the protection of the Constitution of New Hampshire
will receive a final, nonreviewable decision it will look to state constitutional claims first. Id. at
231, 471 A.2d at 351. The court then cited several other cases in which it had previously
departed from the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. Id.
Nonetheless, the court said nothing more than it can and has previously departed from the
Supreme Court's decisions, but gave no explanation of what compelled the court to do so in
this particular case.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut avoided the dilemma of justifying its departure by
viewing its state constitutional power as plenary:
[I]n the area of fundamental civil liberties-which includes all protections of the
declaration of rights contained in article first of the Connecticut Constitution-
we sit as a court of last resort, subject only to the qualification that our
interpretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national citizenry
under the federal charter.
State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 223 n.16, 496 A.2d 498, 506 n.16 (1985) (citing its own
opinion in Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977)). Although this statement
may be constitutionally dispositive, the claim that the court has the authority to deviate does
not say when, in fact, it will deviate.
229. 295 Or. 337, 667 P.2d 996 (1983).
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federal constitutional law in holding that the police had conducted an
illegal search of the defendant upon his arrest.230 Nowhere in the
opinion did the court explain what factors, if any, had led to its depar-
ture from federal principles. Judge Jones' concurrence in that case
expressed concern for what he viewed as a radical departure without
principled reasoning from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States involving the same or similar constitutional provi-
sions. 23  There is no question that the state supreme court has
authority to interpret its state constitution.232 But whether it should
do so as against the federal Constitution in any given case is a ques-
tion that involves balancing the state's interest or lack thereof in pro-
viding greater rights to its citizens against the additional complexity
that will result in a dual constitutional system. As Judge Jones
pointed out, "[the court] must be extremely cautious that ... [its]
decisions do not hopelessly confuse police, prosecutors, defense attor-
neys, judges and the public with search and seizure jurisprudence
unique to Oregon which injects unnecessary complexities into the
law.,
2 33
Although it is true that courts do not always divulge all of the
factors considered in their analyses, carefully reasoned opinions are
especially important when departing from federal principles, both
because of the departure from current expectations and because of the
expectations created for the future. What is required is predictability
in the method by which the state courts determine what areas of the
law carry such a level of state concern that departure from federal
principles is likely. The need for predictable consequences, however,
does not necessarily require a sacrifice of state constitutional indepen-
dence.234 It is the ad hoc manner in which the state courts depart
from principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States
and not the act of departure itself that causes the confusion.235
Achieving predictability requires the use of what could be called
230. Id. at 343, 667 P.2d at 999. See State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 206 n.4, 729 P.2d 524,
530 n.4 (1986). The Supreme Court of Oregon subsequently distinguished Lowry, saying that
in Owens, unlike Lowry, the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was carrying a
controlled substance, and that Owens thus did not concern a "search" or "seizure."
231. 295 Or. at 352, 667 P.2d at 1004.
232. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
233. State v. Lowry, 295 Or. at 352, 667 P.2d at 1005.
234. See People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20 (Colo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984). The dissent
in Corr argued that "law enforcement officers are entitled to rely upon the decisions of our
highest court, and should not have to anticipate that a federally guaranteed constitutional right
will be given a broader interpretation under an all but identical provision in a state
constitution." Id. at 33.
235. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
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a "controlled primacy" model instead of just a pure primacy model.
The pure primacy model only requires the state court to begin with its
own constitution, but requires no justification for choosing the state
constitution over the federal Constitution. As a result, attorneys,
lower courts, and the public are given no indication of what compels
the state court to depart from federal principles, or what may compel
it to do so in the future. The problem is compounded by the fact that
state courts do not apply the same approach in every case. A con-
trolled primacy approach overcomes these difficulties by requiring a
two step methodology. First, the court determines through specified
criteria whether the case at hand is a proper case for broadening
rights provided by the federal Constitution. If the state concerns are
such that departure is necessary, then the court proceeds to the second
step of determining the extent of departure necessary, as is done in a
pure primacy approach.
In State v. Gunwall,236 the Supreme Court of Washington applied
a controlled primacy approach to its telephone search and seizure
provision, demonstrating how both state constitutional activism and
predictability can be achieved simultaneously. The court expanded
the accused's rights against illegal search and seizure by recognizing
the need for predictable consequences in applying a primacy
approach:
Many of the courts now resorting to state constitutions rather than
to analogous provisions of the United States Constitution simply
announce that their decision is based on the state constitution but
do not further explain it. The difficulty with such decisions is that
they establish no principled basis for repudiating federal precedent
and thus furnish little or no rational basis for counsel to predict the
future course of state decisional law.237
To address these concerns, the Supreme Court of Washington set
out six nonexclusive neutral criteria that courts are to apply in deter-
mining when it is appropriate to interpret the state constitution to
give greater rights than those provided by the federal Constitution.
The court first examined the text of the state constitution, using as a
point of departure the view that the state constitution serves a differ-
ent function from that of the federal Constitution. 238 Although the
federal judiciary can act only to exercise the powers and rights
granted in the Constitution of the United States, the state courts must
serve as arbitrators between the states' plenary powers and the citi-
236. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
237. Id. at 60, 720 P.2d at 811-12.
238. Id.
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zens' individual rights.23 9 The emphasis is on the subject matter at
issue and whether it involves an area distinct from the scope of the
federal Constitution. If the state court does find parallel provisions,
and thus a common scope, the next step is to try to find significant
differences in the texts of the two constitutions.24 Finding material
differences in the language, according to the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington, may justify a more expansive interpretation of the state consti-
tution. 24 ' The court went on to say that even if there are no
meaningful differences, other state constitutional provisions may sug-
gest the view that the state constitution be interpreted differently from
the federal Constitution.242 This approach is markedly different from
that of state courts that limit their analyses only to the parallel
provisions.243
The Supreme Court of Washington next turned to state constitu-
tional and common law history, recognizing that "[t]he history of the
adoption of a particular state constitutional provision may reveal an
intention that will support reading the provision independently of fed-
eral law."'24 4 This history provided the court with a perspective in
reading its own constitution. In addition, the court examined its pre-
existing state law to obtain a sense of the provision's legal context.245
At first glance this endeavor may seem to be subjective and unpredict-
able, but if a state has a long history of strict protection in a certain
area, then one would expect a state court to interpret its state consti-
tution to further that protection. The Supreme Court of Washington,
for example, noted that the state had a long history of strictly protect-
ing telephone communications. The state's supreme court, therefore,
would likely read its state constitution's search and seizure provision
to prevent disclosure of long distance calls.24 6
Undertaking a broader analysis, the court addressed the struc-
tural and functional differences between the federal and state constitu-
tions, finding that:
[T]he United States Constitution is a grant of limited power
authorizing the federal government to exercise only those constitu-
tionally enumerated powers expressly delegated to it by the states,
239. Id. at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.
240. Id. at 65, 720 P.2d at 814.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 67, 720 P.2d at 815.
243. See State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255, 260 (1983) (holding that if the language of the two
constitutions is substantially the same, there is no basis for interpreting the state's provision
more broadly than its federal counterpart).
244. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 65-66, 720 P.2d at 814-15.
245. Id. at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.
246. Id. at 67-68, 720 P.2d at 815.
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whereas our state constitution imposes limitations on the otherwise
plenary power of the state to do anything not expressly forbidden
by the state constitution or federal law.24 7
The Supreme Court of Washington thus views its state constitution as
requiring more aggressive protection of individual rights than does
the federal Constitution.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Washington studied matters of
particular state interest or of local concern. It balanced what it per-
ceived as the weight of the state's concern, derived from the above
criteria, against the disruption of national uniformity that its depar-
ture from the rule would cause. The court concluded from such an
analysis that the "overwhelming state policy consideration" tipped
the scales in favor of independent state analysis.248 Having justified
its use of separate and independent state grounds on the basis of the
six-part test, the court went on to analyze its state constitution to
determine the specific departure required.249 The whole process took
only two pages of the opinion to describe. The court laid a foundation
which not only justified its use of broader state principles in this case,
but also provided predictable consequences in future cases. The kind
of reasoned and articulated analysis conducted by the Washington
court may well have been what the Supreme Court intended state
courts to undertake in response to Long.25° But Washington's
approach is the exception and not the rule.
The absence of more state opinions of this nature may be due
both to the message of Long and the timidity of many state courts.
The Court in Long, in essence, said that if the state court declared it
was deciding a case on independent state grounds, the Court would
take the state court's word for it.2"' Allowing the state courts simply
to rubber stamp their decisions without any monitoring of the under-
lying substance of the opinions hardly gives them an incentive to
develop their own state doctrines. The Supreme Court, however, is
limited in its capacity to force state courts to undertake an exhaustive
study of their own constitutions. At the same time, many state courts
remain uneasy about developing the kind of analysis displayed by the
Supreme Court of Washington.252 Despite Long, many state courts
cling to an interstitial approach and refuse to view their own constitu-
247. Id. at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.
248. Id. at 67, 720 P.2d at 815.
249. Id. at 67-68, 720 P.2d at 815-16.
250. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
251. Id.
252. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
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tions as the primary protectors of individual rights.253 One can only
speculate that their hesitation may be due to a reluctance to develop
this kind of analysis. In any case, this is not something the Supreme
Court can compel; it must be sought by each state. Eventually other
states may follow Washington's example, but they will do so out of
choice and not because of compulsion by the Supreme Court.
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding survey of cases decided after Long, at both the
Supreme Court and state levels, exposes at least four aspects in which
the Long approach has yet to respond to the problems it set out to
solve. First, it has not lessened the Supreme Court's burden of
reviewing state law.254 Unless the rubber stamp is present, the
Supreme Court must still explore the state court's opinion to deter-
mine if it is substantively based on state law grounds. Even in cases in
which the state court cited state precedent, the Court has felt com-
pelled to examine those cases to determine whether they expound
state or federal law.
The second failure of the Long approach has been its inability to
prevent the delivery of advisory opinions by the Supreme Court.2 5
When state courts maintain their position on state law grounds after
the Supreme Court has reversed on federal grounds, they take away
any substantial effect that federal court review might have had. The
only sure way to avoid this problem is to ensure that those state
courts that are likely to revert to state grounds on remand rely
expressly on state law grounds in their original opinion. As the use of
the rubber stamp has demonstrated, the Long approach, which
sought to encourage the state courts to rely on state grounds, has
neither been practical nor successful. Third, the Supreme Court's
inability to refrain from intervention has resulted in the waste of
scarce judicial resources and a continuing disrespect for state deci-
sions.256 This situation is apparent in those cases in which the
Supreme Court has reviewed a state court decision on federal grounds
and forced the state court to justify its reinstatement of its original
decision on state grounds. The fourth concern, presented by Justice
Stevens, is that issues are not being percolated in the state courts
before being reviewed by the Supreme Court.257 The Long approach,
253. See supra notes 207-21 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 75-124 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 125-59 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 160-89 and accompanying text.
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by encouraging Supreme Court review, discourages this type of
percolation.
The Long approach has also failed to achieve its stated goal of
encouraging state courts to develop state constitutional principles.
The rubber stamp has not persuaded state courts to apply state law
principles when they review a trial court's decision for the first time.
The state courts that have chosen to follow the interstitial model of
decision have not been deterred by the language in Long. They have
continued to place federal analysis before state analysis and in many
cases have failed to provide the latter. They simply state that they are
deciding the case on independent and adequate state grounds. For
states following the interstitial model, this is all that Long has
required and it is all that it has achieved.
It is more difficult to determine whether the Court has achieved
its hidden goal, if indeed it was a goal, of having more cases available
for its review, thereby enabling it to constrain or reduce defendants'
constitutional protections. It is apparent that the Long approach did,
in the short run, result in more cases being reviewed. On the other
hand, the use of the rubber stamp allows a state to escape this review
if it wishes to do so. Therefore, even if the Court's hidden goal was to
review more cases, as state courts become increasingly adept at using
the rubber stamp, the likelihood of this goal being realized will be
reduced.
Having found that the Long approach has thus far not accom-
plished what the Court intended it to achieve, the next question is
whether the Court's goals established in Long are appropriate in the
first place. Those opposed to Long will argue that as a practical con-
sequence there is no problem to solve. The state courts' decisions,
whether made on federal of state grounds, have no national binding
effect. Within its own territorial jurisdiction each state court has the
power to set the ceiling of individual rights. The fact that a state
court rests its analysis on federal precedent and principles has no
national consequence. To that state's citizen, who is the only one
affected, the fact that the court sets the ceiling at a certain level means
that the ceiling will be at that level regardless of whether the stated
grounds are based on federal or state law. If a state wishing to raise
the ceiling is unable to use federal law, it will use state law. Further,
the Long approach allows a state court to continue to use federal law
and yet, by the use of the rubber stamp, avoid Supreme Court review.
Therefore, the state court is, in effect, choosing whether or not to
allow review. This means that the Court has failed to achieve its goal
of gaining control over the constitutional protection of defendants in
1987]
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criminal cases, if, in fact, that is what the Court truly intended. The
Supreme Court's struggle to insure independent state grounds, there-
fore, is a futile effort that will only result in more advisory opinions.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court attempts to enforce an "ade-
quacy" prong along with the "independent" prong of the Long
approach, the result will be an intrusion by the Supreme Court into
the states' realm. Forcing the state courts to examine the means and
motives of their actions too carefully, and only in the light of state
law, might cause them to shy away from their independent function
as final arbiters of state constitutional law. Federal law is a result of
the percolation of ideas from all the states. Using federal precedent
allows the states to draw upon this experience. It helps them both to
clarify and justify their decisions. Requiring an "adequate" ground,
as interpreted not by the state supreme courts who are the final inter-
preters of their own laws, but by the Supreme Court of the United
States, is a tremendous intrusion into the states' constitutional sphere.
The state courts would no longer be able to avoid Supreme Court
review. If the states are inhibited in this way, the Supreme Court will
be setting both the floor and the ceiling on individual rights. Further,
the Supreme Court will be forcing the state courts to justify their deci-
sions to it. The question then arises whether the Supreme Court can
force this type of justification from the state courts or whether this
would be an unconstitutional, or otherwise impermissible, intrusion
into the realm of state prerogative. At the very least, this type of
intrusion would support Justice Stevens' claim of disrespect for state
courts.
As long as state courts have the ability to revert back to state law
grounds, then whether they do revert has no practical consequence.
This is not to say, however, that the state courts should not accept the
responsibility of carefully analyzing their own constitutions; just that
they cannot, and should not, be forced to do so by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
On the other hand, proponents of Long argue that although state
courts ultimately are able to raise the ceiling of rights enjoyed by indi-
viduals, two important reasons remain why the Supreme Court
should constrain the state courts to their own state constitutional
spheres. First, constitutional principles dictate that the Supreme
Court is the sole and final arbiter of the Constitution of the United
States. 258 The abdication by the Supreme Court of this role in matters
concerning federal constitutional principles above the floor, in
essence, allows a conflicting interpretation of the federal Constitution
258. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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at the state level. The states would be able to set federal constitu-
tional law above the floor set by the Supreme Court. This result, in
turn, could create fifty different interpretations of the gap left by the
Supreme Court. The state courts would not be interpreting their own
constitutions within their sovereign authority, but would instead be
establishing federal principles within the federal sphere. Clearly, such
a development, were it to occur, would not bind the Supreme Court to
state interpretations of federal principles; nonetheless, as long as the
Supreme Court chooses to honor the Long approach, the state courts
will be able to shield their decisions from direct Supreme Court
review. Nor does the states' ability to block Supreme Court review
through a rubber stamp in the short run mean that the Supreme
Court cannot ultimately establish federal principles. What can result,
however, is that citizens in one state will have greater federal constitu-
tional protection than those in another state. Some may therefore
conclude that the state decisions will only have a marginal and tempo-
rary effect on federal principles. If this were true, the proper
approach would be to go back to outright dismissal of the cases as
merely verbiage by the state courts. Yet Justice O'Connor empha-
sized the need to review these cases by saying that "outright dismissal
of cases is clearly not a panacea because it cannot be doubted that
there is an important need for uniformity in federal law, and that this
need goes unsatisfied when we fail to review an opinion that rests pri-
marily upon federal grounds and where the independence of an
alleged state ground is not apparent from the four corners of the opin-
ion. '' 59 Thus, the Court in Long recognized the need for federal uni-
formity and the fragmenting effect that ignoring state decisions would
have on federal principles.
Additionally, and more importantly for state constitutional
development, proponents of the Long approach can argue that there is
a real need for the Supreme Court to keep the state courts within their
state constitutional boundaries. Only by requiring the state courts to
show both independent and adequate grounds will the Court elimi-
nate advisory opinions and force the state courts to account for their
departures from federal principles. The Supreme Court has only
applied the "independent grounds" prong of Long, while leaving the
"adequacy" prong untested.26 Allowing the state courts to apply fed-
eral law and just rubber stamp their opinions has avoided an open
conflict between federal and state law principles. Were the adequacy
prong to be activated, the state courts would then necessarily have to
259. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040.
260. Collins and Galie, supra note 14, at 340.
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weigh their interest in providing greater rights against the lack of pre-
dictability and the haphazard manner in which they have been estab-
lishing state constitutional principles.26' This analysis in turn would
require state courts to exercise greater judicial responsibility. Justice
Pollock expressed his concern this way: "State courts should not look
to their constitutions only when they wish to reach a result different
from the United States Supreme Court. 2 62 The use of state constitu-
tions should be principled and not simply results oriented if state
courts are truly going to take responsibility for developing their own
state constitutional jurisprudence.
In conclusion, this Note demonstrates that the Long doctrine has
failed in its stated goal of encouraging state courts to develop state
constitutional law. In addition, the concerns of the Supreme Court in
alleviating the need to examine state law and in reducing the issuance
of advisory opinons have not been resolved. This Note suggests two
possible alternatives to the Long doctrine, and points out some of
their potential consequences: First, that the Supreme Court require
and enforce the "adequate" prong of the independent and adequate
state grounds approach; and second, that the Supreme Court simply
refuse to accept review in cases where the state courts have extended
constitutional protections. This Note does not presume to know
which alternative, if either, the Supreme Court will choose; it only
points out the fact that the concerns addressed in Long have not been
resolved, and if the Supreme Court does, in fact, wish to resolve these
concerns, an approach different from that of Long must be chosen.
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261. The six criteria established by the Supreme Court of Washington presented truly
"adequate" state grounds. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13. An
analysis of this kind would not require, as Justice O'Connor feared, the Supreme Court to
undertake an extensive review of state law issues. The Gunwall opinion clearly and expressly
indicates that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent
grounds and does not require speculation about state law by the Supreme Court. The
difference is in the substance. Although the other state courts say they are relying on
independent and adequate grounds, Washington proved it did.
262. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS
L. REv. 707, 717 (1983).
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